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Non-technical summary: Drawing on a large-scale German Linked EmployerEmployee data set spanning the time period 1995-2008, this paper provides new evidence on the collective bargaining wage premium in western Germany. By using longitudinal data, we seek to improve on recent evidence which relies on cross-sectional data. Unlike the previous literature, we assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms result from a non-random selection of workers and firms upon time-invariant unobservables into the different regimes. The fact that we observe employers changing their contract status over time provides us with the opportunity to measure the relative wage gains or losses of workers employed in firms that change their contract status.
Taken together, our analysis of separate transitions suggests that workers in firms leaving industry-level bargaining may incur wage losses relative to those workers who are employed by "stable" firms. However, adjusting the estimates for differential time trends supports the notion that plants changing from industry-level contracts to no coverage experience more negative time-specific shocks than stable plants, thereby confirming the result that there is no "true" wage effect of leaving wage bargaining.
For firm-level contracts, the analysis of separate transitions shows that joining firm-level bargaining from no-coverage may be associated with a positive wage premium, whereas the transitions between firm and industry-level contracts tend to give rise to negative wage premiums of firm-level contracts. This finding is consistent with firm-level bargaining being initiated by employers who were formerly covered by an industry-level contract and argues against the view that unions tend to enforce such contracts in order to secure above average wage gains in highly successful firms.
Introduction
The question of whether unions are able to drive a wedge between the wages of comparable workers in the union and non-union sector is of considerable interest to an understanding of the wage determination process. While the empirical literature for the U.S. and the U.K. has primarily focused on union membership as a determinant of individual wages (e.g., Farber 1983 , Freeman 1984 , Card 1996 There is a large theoretical literature on the link between the bargaining structure and wages (Calmfors and Driffill 1988, Moene et al. 1993) , whose predictions have been tested in a number of cross-country studies (Calmfors and Driffill 1988 , Soskice 1990 , OECD 1997 , Calmfors 2001 ). More recently, with the increasing availability of linked employer-employee data, the relationship between collective bargaining coverage and wage outcomes has attracted renewed interest. By providing both information on wages at the individual level and collective bargaining coverage at the employers' level, such data permit to exploit intra-national variations in the bargaining structure to assess its impact on the level and structure of wages. Examples to detect any positive effect of bargaining coverage on wages, Stephan and Gerlach (2005) document sizeable wage premiums ranging between 7 and 11 log points for industry and firm-level contracts. Fitzenberger et al. (2008) find that the share of employees subject to a collective bargaining contract is associated with a positive 1 wage mark-up, which is found to be larger under firm-level contracts. In a similar vein, the evidence by Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Card and de la Rica (2006) points to higher wage premiums under firm-level as compared to industry-level contracts.
Our paper presents new evidence on the collective bargaining wage premium, using a large-scale German linked employer-employee data set. Our analysis of collective bargaining coverage and wages for Germany is motivated by several reasons.
To begin with, and most importantly, previous linked employer-employee data evidence on the collective bargaining effect relies on cross-sectional data and typically fails to address the selection problem. 1 As has already been argued in the literature on union membership wage effects, selection is likely to be a major issue, if collective bargaining contracts raise wages above the competitive wage and compress the returns to observable attributes. In this case, observed and unobserved productivity components are likely to be negatively correlated since, e.g., workers with low observed skills will only be hired if they exhibit high unobserved skills (see Farber 1983 , Card 1996 , Lemieux 2000 . In order to deal with such a potential selection bias, the evidence presented in this paper is based on a longitudinal data set. Hence, unlike the studies cited above, we seek to assess the extent to which differences in wages between workers in covered and uncovered firms result from a non-random selection of workers and firms upon time-invariant unobservables into the different regimes. The fact that we observe employers changing their contract status over time provides us with the opportunity to measure the relative wage gains or losses of workers employed in firms that change their contract status. Clearly, such an identification strategy rules out the endogeneity of a change in contract status, since establishments changing contract status may experience different timespecific shocks than those that retain their contract status. While we are not able to deal with this endogeneity problem by exploiting an exogenous variation in contract status, we shall attempt to assess the severity of this problem. The strategy we pursue here is to analyse transitions between the regimes separately and to adopt a trend-adjusted difference-in-difference estimator which permits us to account for differences in time-specific shocks across establishments that change contract status and those that do not.
Secondly, the German case provides an instructive example for continental European extension mechanisms. Although negotiated wages strictly speaking only apply to union members, firms generally extend wage settlements to non-member employees as well. Moreover, central wage contracts may also apply to non-member firms if an agreement is declared to be generally binding. As a consequence, despite declining union membership among employees, which to date has reached a rela- A final, third, motivation is based on the fact that the institutional environment in Germany is characterised by the coexistence of different bargaining regimes.
Collective bargaining contracts may take the form of either firm-level contracts or industry-level contracts. Moreover, in recent years wage determination without any bargaining coverage has become more important. Thus, with the increasing importance of the uncovered sector it is possible to compare wage outcomes under firm-level and industry-level contracts as well as for workers in covered and uncovered firms.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional background information on German wage determination. Section 3.1.
sets out the estimation strategy for quantifying the wage premiums under different collective wage contracts. While Section 3.2. provides a description of the data set used, Section 3.3. presents the estimation results. The final Section 4 concludes.
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Institutional Background
In this section we provide some background on how collective bargaining affects ("Tarifvertragsgesetz ") employers leaving their employers' association are subject to a validity time limit according to which the contract terms continue to apply until the respective contract has expired. Note that this also holds true for leaving firmlevel arrangements. Second, even if a contract has already expired, the law dictates that employers replace the contract terms by individual contracts or, alternatively, by a firm-specific contract in order to be able to depart from previous contractual arrangements. However, at this point it is worth noting that the decision to leave industry-level bargaining is not necessarily left to the employer's discretion. For instance, even if a firm prefers to stay uncovered, its union may attempt to enforce a firm-specific contract. Whether such an attempt succeeds, ultimately depends on firm-specific union density. The underlying rationale is that the union's ability to present the employer with a credible threat to strike may be expected to increase considerably with the proportion of workers who are organised in that union. 4 Although the absolute number of firm-specific collective wage agreements has increased markedly since the beginning of the 1990s, this increase cannot explain the declining importance of industry-level contracts. Evidence from the IAB-Establishment
Panel indicates that the share of establishments reporting the existence of a firmlevel contract fell from 10 to 3 per cent over the time period 1996 to 2007. 5 Thus, the 2 Own calculations based on IAB-Establishment Panel. 3 For example, the employers' association "Gesamtmetall" reports that the share of employees at member firms as a percentage of total employment in the metal and electrical industry fell in western Germany from 72 per cent to 55 per cent over the time period 1991 to 2007 (Gesamtmetall 2012) . 4 Indirect evidence for this is provided by Fitzenberger et al. (2008) . Using a cross-section from the German Salary and Wage Structure Survey the authors find the effect of firm-specific collective bargaining coverage increase with the aggregate propensity of union membership. 
Empirical Analysis
Estimation Strategy
To quantify the collective bargaining wage premiums, we consider a wage equation taking the following form:
where the error component may be written as
There are i = 1,..., N individuals, and N * = ∑ T i total worker-year observations. As we use matched worker-establishment data, j refers to the establishment that employs individual i at time t, i.e., we strictly speaking have j = j(i, t),
The dependent variable, ln w it , is the individual log daily wage.
The explanatory variables of main interest are C jt and F jt , which are indicator variables taking on the value of unity if the establishment that employs individual i at time t is subject to a centralised industry-level or a firm-level contract, respectively. 
where first-differencing within each spell sweeps out θ s . Thus, the coefficients on ∆C jt and ∆F jt will yield a consistent estimator of the wage premiums as long as ∆C jt and ∆F jt are uncorrelated with ∆λ jt and ∆ϵ it . Finally, to assess the impact of collective bargaining coverage on the overall wage structure, we will also estimate a fully interacted model, which includes interaction terms of all covariates with the contract status dummies. The interacted regressors are expressed in terms of deviations from their sample means, allowing us to interpret the estimated coefficient on industry and firm-level contracts as the wage premium for a worker with the average characteristics of the full sample. As a result, the interacted specification 7 reads as
From eqs. (3) and (4) 
Eqs. (3) and (4) clarify that identification based upon spell differencing relies on the assumption that a change in contract status is uncorrelated with time-specific unobservables. This assumption rules out that, e.g., establishments changing contract status are subject to different time-specific unobservables than those that retain their contract status. Clearly, it is easy to imagine situations in which this assumption will be violated. On the employer's side, for example, leaving collective bargaining might be systematically correlated with negative developments. On the union's side, however, enforcing a firm-level contract might be correlated with positive shocks if unions are more likely to do so in better times and successful firms (DiNardo and Lee 2004). In such a case, identification of the contract wage premium requires instrumental variables that affect contract status but not wages. Unfortunately, it is hard to think of any variables satisfying these requirements. 6 However, we attempt to assess the severity and direction of a potential endogeneity bias. To do so, we separately analyse transitions from one regime to the other and adopt for each time period a trend-adjusted difference-in-difference estimator as discussed in Bell et al. 
equals zero, since otherwise we have
where the BIAS is given by eq. (5). 7 If, for example, establishments leaving industry-level bargaining are suffering from more negative time trends than those that retain their contract status, the term in eq. (5) will be negative, thereby giving rise to a downward biased estimate of −γ C . To adjust the estimator of γ C for this potential bias, we will attempt to match the term given by eq. (5) by estimating the differential in wage growth in the pre-transition periods, i.e. by
Subtracting this expression from the (biased) difference-in-difference estimator for γ C will consistently identify γ C , provided a similar macro-trend has occurred over the interval t−k−1 to t−k. At this point, it is worth noting that our data restrictions will not allow us to estimate the difference in time trends by using information from a longer pre-transition time interval, as most of our regime switchers cannot be tracked over a longer time period prior to the observed transitions. Given that we have to rely on wage growth in at most two pre-transition years (i.e. k = 2) , the 7 A further assumption is conditional mean independence of ∆C jt and ∆ε it . (5) should basically reverse its sign. However, the discussion in Section 2 has shown that the institutional impediments to changing contract status render such anticipation effects very unlikely. This is particularly true for those regime changes from existing contracts that are associated with lower wages in the pre-transition periods. The reason is that any regime switch that involves leaving an existing contract may be expected to come into effect after a certain time lag after the transition has taken place. For existing contracts, this implies that negative differences in pre-transition wage growth are difficult to reconcile with anticipation effects. 
Data and Variable Description
In the empirical analysis we use data from the IAB Linked Employer-Employee . We confine our analysis to western Germany as we argue that the endogeneity problem is likely to be somewhat smaller than in eastern Germany. The reason is that in western Germany unionisation is likely to be more exogenous, since it presumably reflects to a larger extent the result of a historically grown industrial relations structure as compared with eastern Germany. As to collective bargaining coverage, establishments are asked to report whether they are bound to a centralised industry-wide collective wage agreement (C) or, alternatively, to a firm-specific wage agreement (F ). Moreover, since 1999 establishments without any binding collective contract (N ) are asked whether they follow informally the terms of an industry-wide agreement. However, for the available waves respondents are not asked to provide any information on the precise nature of the voluntarily applied contract terms. As a result, the informational content of this question remains rather elusive. Throughout the following analysis, collective bargaining status therefore refers to the existence of a legally binding agreement, i.e. establishments informally following the terms of an industry agreement will be treated as being uncovered. As a consequence, our estimated wage premiums need to be interpreted as wage mark-ups associated with a legally binding collective wage agreement.
To avoid measuring spurious changes in contract status, we exploit the fact that employers face two legal impediments to leaving wage bargaining as set out in Section 2: The first one relates to the validity time limit according to which the contract terms continue to apply until the respective contract has expired, whereas the second one is due to the fact that employers are obliged to replace the contract terms by individual contracts in order to be able to depart from previous contractual arrangements. It is reasonable to believe that such a replacement will take place after a certain time lag and is likely to occur only if non-coverage is maintained for a sufficient amount of time. For this reason, we argue that employers who report a change from industry/firm-level coverage to no coverage and then an immediate change to either industry or firm-level coverage are very unlikely to have replaced the original contract terms by individual contracts. As a consequence, we impute all reported F N F and CN C sequences by F F F and CCC sequences, respectively.
In our sample this affects 9 and 54 out of 1,724 establishments. In a similar vein, F N C and CN F sequences are substituted by F F C and CCF , which affects 15 and 7 establishments, respectively. Moreover, for those plants with at least 4 time-series observations, who report the same regime for all time periods but one, we further impute the reported outlier-regime by the remaining regimes -in our sample this affects 50 establishments. From the remaining establishments, we exclude those that change their collective bargaining status more than once in the time-period under consideration. This affects 82 out of 335 establishments that still exhibit a variation in contract status. In section 3.3.5, we will conduct some robustness checks with respect to this exclusion and our adopted imputation procedure.
In the second step, we merge the establishment data with individual-level in- 
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The individual data include information on the gross daily wage, age, gender, nationality, employment status (blue/white-collar), educational status (three categories) 13 and on individual tenure, which has been adjusted for employment interruptions at the same employer. The dependent variable in the subsequent analysis is the real gross daily wage, which is reported inclusive of fringe-benefits as long as such wage supplements are subject to social security contributions. Since there is an upper contribution limit to the social security system, gross daily wages are 10 Part time workers are excluded because the Employment Statistics Register lacks explicit information on hours worked. 11 The threshold is defined as the twice amount of the lower social security contribution limit. 12 Note that we lose some further establishments due to the exclusion of movers and those workerfirm combinations with less than two consecutive time-series observations. 13 The categories are: Low-skilled (no vocational degree), medium-skilled (completed vocational degree), high-skilled (technical college degree or university degree). Missing and inconsistent data on education are corrected according to the imputation procedure described in Fitzenberger et al. (2006) . This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption that individuals cannot lose their educational degrees. Turning to the establishment variables, we control for establishment size, percapita value added, the capital-labour ratio, the existence of a works council as well as collective bargaining coverage.
15 Table 1 14 The two categories are: Low-skilled and medium/high-skilled. 15 A more detailed description of the construction of the establishment variables can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix. As to the individual characteristics, workers under firm and industry-specific contracts are, on average, more likely to be male, are less likely to have no vocational degree and have more months of tenure relative to uncovered individuals. As a result, most of the differences in observed establishment and individual characteristics would generally predict higher wages for workers in covered establishments, which clearly requires a multivariate estimation strategy. 
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Results
Pooled OLS Results
From the descriptive statistics in Table 1 it can be seen that the raw wage differential amounts to about 20 log points under industry contracts and to 29 log points under firm-level contracts. Column (1) in Table 2 shows the results from estimating a pooled OLS (POLS) regressions controlling for a full set of individual and establishment characteristics. The figures show that with some minor exceptions all individual and establishment covariates enter the specifications with their expected sign and are significant at the 1%-level. 16 The estimates in Column (1) indicate that the wage premiums of both industry and firm-level contracts drop by about 70
and 80 per cent, respectively, once differences in individual and establishment characteristics are controlled for. Overall, the (unreported) results from stepwise POLS regressions indicate that observable establishment characteristics, such as differences in establishment size, per-capita value added and the capital-labour ratio, account for the largest proportion of omitted variable bias in the raw wage differentials.
Unobserved Establishment Heterogeneity
Given that establishment characteristics explain the largest proportion of the raw wage differentials, we next control for establishment fixed effects to assess the extent to which sorting of unobservably better employers into the regimes affects our estimates. With an establishment fixed effects specification, the wage premiums associated with firm and industry-level contracts are identified solely from withinestablishment variation in contract status. To gain an idea about the underlying dynamics with respect to collective bargaining status, Table 3 reports the number of observed transitions between the three regimes. 17 Closer inspection of the 16 In particular, establishment size, per-capita value added and the capital-labour ratio are found to be positively related to wages, a result which is consistent with what has been found earlier in the literature. For firm size effects see e.g. Oi and Idson (1999) , German evidence on employer size effects is provided by Schmidt and Zimmermann (1991) . Hildreth and Oswald (1997) and Arai (2003) present international evidence on the wage-profit relationship, while evidence for Germany is documented in Hübler and König (1998) and Guertzgen (2009) . 17 The number of individuals affected by each transition is reported in Table 5 .
off-diagonal entries in Table 3 shows that 253 out of 1,613 establishments (15.7
per cent) changed contract status between 1995 and 2007, with the biggest movement taking place between no-coverage and industry-level contracts. In addition, the figures indicate that the number of establishments becoming uncovered (119 "quitters") if found to exceed the number of establishments becoming covered (72 "joiners"). Column (2) in Table 2 shows the results from estimating a establishment fixed effects specification. 18 While the coefficients on the individual covariates are quite similar to those from the OLS specifications, the coefficients on the plantlevel variables decline substantially for the majority of covariates. The coefficient on industry-level contracts becomes very small and insignificant, whereas the wage premium under firm-level contract is even negative. Overall, these findings indicate that the wage premiums essentially vanish once the non-random selection of firms into the bargaining regimes is accounted for. Note, however, that the establishment fixed effect may also reflect a positive selection on behalf of workers as long as ϕ j reflects a time-constant unobservably better workforce composition. 
Unobserved Individual and Establishment Heterogeneity
The estimated wage mark-ups might still be biased if a within-establishment variation of contract status were correlated with a change in the composition of workers' unobservable skills. To address this further source of bias, we next control for both individual and establishment-specific unobservables, α i and ϕ j , by estimating a spell differenced specification. Note that identification of both α i and ϕ j is driven by individuals who move between establishments within our sample. In the extreme case of no turnover between sample establishments, spell and individual fixed-effects yield the same results, and α i and ϕ j cannot be separately identified. A closer examination of the distribution of the number of spells shows that the majority of individuals do not move between sample establishments -only 0.9 per cent of all workers in the original sample move from one sample establishment to another. 19 Moreover, out of 615 establishments with sample movers, 433 (about 70 per cent) employ less than 5 movers (out of which 221 have only one single mover). We therefore excluded movers from our sample and do not separately identify α i and ϕ j as proposed by Abowd et al. (1999) , since for a large number of firms such an identification would have to rely on a very small number of movers to estimate the establishment effect.
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Column (3) of Table 2 reports the results from the spell fixed effects specifications.
Since first differencing involves the loss of at least one wave for each worker, the number of observations drops to 2,063,951. 21 The figures show that spell differencing does not alter the estimates of the wage premiums substantially. Overall, these results suggest that establishments changing contract status do not experience a simultaneous change in the unobservable skill composition of their workforce. Note that this contrasts with other establishment covariates, such as value added and the capital-labour ratio, whose coefficients are estimated to be smaller once changes in the composition of workers' unobservable skills are accounted for.
As mentioned earlier, much of the empirical research on union wage effects sug- 19 The low proportion of movers is due to the fact that the linked employer-employee data set is based on a sample of establishments. As a result, the probability of observing workers moving from one sample establishment to another is very low. It is important to note that the low proportion of movers does not imply that our data set is restricted to very stable employment relationships as workers (and firms) may enter and exit the panel. 20 The descriptive statistics of the spell differenced variables are displayed in Table A2 in the appendix. For the majority of covariates, the figures indicate a considerable dispersion of the differenced values over time. Exceptions are the skill dummies, where only a very small fraction of workers experience a change in these variables. It is worth noting that these changes are unlikely to reflect pure measurement error, as we adopted an imputation procedure to correct misreporting of the education variable (see Section 3.2).
21 Note, however, that the resulting number of observations after spell differencing is smaller than the number of total individual observations minus the number of individuals, as the sample includes workers with intermittent panel participation.
gests that unions do not only affect the mean but also the overall dispersion of wages through their impact on the returns to worker and firm attributes. To assess the im- pact of collective bargaining coverage on the overall wage structure, Table 4 reports the estimates of a fully interacted spell differenced specification, which includes interaction terms of all covariates with the contract status dummies. The average wage premiums for firm and industry-level contracts are presented in the first row of Columns (2) and (3) The estimated interaction effects in Table 4 show that the estimated returns to most of the individual attributes are not significantly smaller for covered individuals.
The returns to tenure are larger under both firm and industry level contracts. Moreover, firm-level contracts are found to significantly increase the returns to medium and high-skilled qualifications. Note that these findings stand in contrast to what is typically obtained by a simple interacted POLS regression, suggesting that collective contracts reduce the returns to observable worker attributes. 22 This pattern of results is consistent with the notion that the typical flattening of the wage structure that emerges from a simple POLS specification arises from a selectivity bias, since workers with low levels of observed skills tend to be positively selected and workers with higher levels of observed skills tend to be negatively selected into covered firms.
To highlight this selection process, it may be instructive to compare, for example, the firm-level wage premium among workers without any vocational degree to the premium among high-skilled workers (with a technical college or university degree).
For the latter, the wage premium resulting from an (unreported) interacted POLS specification is -4.7 log points and increases to 1 log points in the spell differenced specification. By comparison, for a worker without any degree the interacted POLS specification implies a positive wage premium of 3.5 log points, which drops to about -2.6 log points once the selection into the regimes is accounted for. As a result, the estimates of the equalising effect of firm-level contracts on low-skilled workers from the POLS specification considerably overstate the true equalising effect and may even reverse the premiums across skills. As to the returns to establishment attributes, the estimates show that the returns to plant size are larger under industry-level contracts, even though the coefficient on the interaction term only borders significance (with a p-value of 0.12). Moreover, both firm and industry-level contracts are found to decrease the returns to establishment productivity, even though the interaction term under industry-level contracts is fairly imprecisely estimated.
Analysing Separate Transitions
Even though the spell differenced specifications conditioned on an important set of establishment characteristics such as changes in establishment size, capital intensity and productivity, a change in contract status might still be correlated with time-specific unobservables. To assess the severity and direction of a potential endogeneity bias, we now present the estimation results based on a trend-adjusted difference-in-difference approach. To do so, we separately analyse transitions from one regime to the other by contrasting the wage growth of individuals experiencing a change in contract status to the wage growth of those individuals who are employed by plants that stay in the origin regime. As set out in section 3.1, the resulting estimator is adjusted for differences in changes in time-specific shocks by subtracting the differential in wage growth in the pre-transition periods. Due to a change in the survey question in 1998, the analysis of separate transitions will be confined to the period 1999 to 2007. 23 To gain further insights into potential sources of different time-specific shocks, Table A3 in the appendix presents characteristics of switching establishments compared with those in the reference groups. Closer inspection of differences in observable characteristics may give us some further indication about the severity of a potential endogeneity bias as it seems reasonable to assume that differences in unobservable factors are likely to be correlated with differences in observables. In Table 5 , each panel's first row presents the estimates of the wage premium of a particular transition. The third column contains the estimated wage premium in the transition period t. This wage premium is based on the pooled estimation of eq. (4) on the subsample of plants that experience a change in contract status in t ("regime switchers") and those plants that always adopt the origin regime ("stable plants"). For those employers and workers for whom sufficient time-series observations are available, the remaining columns contain the estimated differences in wage growth between regime switchers and stable plants in the pre and post-transition years t − 1, t − 2, t + 1 and t + 2, respectively. These estimates are again based on the pooled estimations of eq. (4) for the respective time periods on the subsample of regime switchers and stable plants. 24 Finally, each panel's second (third) row presents the trend-adjusted wage premiums which result from the differences between the estimated wage premiums in t, t + 1 and t + 2 and the pre-transition differentials in wage growth in t − 1 (t − 2).
Turning first to the transitions from industry to firm-level contracts, Table 5 reports a significantly negative wage premium of -3.1 log points in period t. The wage premium in t + 1 is of similar magnitude. The estimated difference in pretransition wage growth in t−1 is found to be positive and significant, indicating that wages for these regime changers did rise relatively stronger prior to the transition year. 25 With respect to the pre-transition differentials in wage growth in t − 1, this 24 This amounts to estimating eq. (4) including the respective lags and leads of a dummy variable that indicates the change in contract status in t. To estimate the pre and post-transition wage growth differentials, we include all individuals in the respective time periods, i.e. also those who are not employed by the regime switchers in period t. We further exclude from these individuals those who are also subject to a change in contract status in t − 1, t − 2, t + 1 and t + 2, respectively. 25 Note that the discussion in Section 3.1 has shown that positive differences in pre-transition wage growth may not rule out mere anticipation effects as firms are generally free to pay higher 23 gives rise to significantly negative wage premiums of firm-level contracts in t and t + 1.
In the next panel, the estimate for the wage premium in t indicates that individuals subject to a change from firm to industry-level contracts experience no significant wage change relative to those individuals in stable plants. This contrasts with the wage premiums for the subsequent time periods t + 1 and t + 2, which are estimated to be positive. However, the descriptive statistics in Panel C in Table   A3 in the appendix indicate that these estimates might still be downward biased, as establishments joining industry-level contracts are considerably smaller and less capital-intensive than those that are always covered by firm-level contracts. While the notion that "joiners" of industry-level contracts might have experienced different time-specific shocks is not supported by the differences in pre-transition wage growth in t−1, it is confirmed by the significantly negative difference in wage growth in t−2. This gives rise to trend-adjusted positive estimates for γ C , whose coefficients are found to be highly significant in period t, t + 1 and t + 2.
The next panel in Table 5 shows the results for the transitions from industrylevel bargaining to no-coverage. The estimate for the wage premium in t indicates that individuals in leaving plants experience no immediate significant wage change relative to those individuals who are always covered by industry-level contracts.
However, workers in leaving plants incur a significant relative wage loss one and two years after the transition, indicating that wage adjustments after contract status change may take some time (see the estimates for t + 1 and t + 2). As set out in section 3.1, for establishments leaving industry-level contracts one might expect a downward biased estimate of the overall wage premium (corresponding to an upward bias of the industry-level contract wage premium relative to uncovered plants). The underlying notion is that the decision to leave industry-level bargaining is likely to be correlated with negative shocks. The estimates in row (2) indicate that this wages than those stipulated in the wage contract. However, our results for the industry to firmlevel transitions show that the larger pre-transition wage growth among the regime switchers is not found to continue in the transition period and is therefore unlikely to reflect anticipation effects.
expectation is borne out by the estimates, as the negative wage premiums become smaller and insignificant once negative pre-transition differences in wage growth are accounted for. Note that the evidence of a downward biased estimate is further confirmed by differences in observables in Panel B in Table A3 . The figures show that leaving plants differ considerably in firm size, productivity and capital intensity from stable plants, with all differences being statistically significant.
Analysing the transitions from no-coverage to industry-level contracts, the es- Table A3 do not give a clue regarding these potential explanations: Neither do switching employers have a larger fraction of works councils than stable plants nor do they exhibit any systematic differences in the workforce composition which might help explain a larger propensity of union organisation. The only differences that stand out are that establishments joining industry-level contracts have a somewhat larger fraction of blue-collar workers than those always staying uncovered. An alternative explanation might be that the decision to join industry-level contracts is driven by others factors.
For instance, employers might favour industry-level contracts as standardised wage agreements save transaction costs that typically arise when stipulating individual or firm-specific contracts.
The transitions from firm-level contracts to no-coverage show that workers in leaving plants experience a relative wage loss of 1.5 and 0.9 log points one and two years after the transition. However, these wage premiums are very imprecisely estimated. Even though workers in leaving plants tend to experience a larger wage growth prior to the transitions, the negative trend-adjusted wage premiums are also insignificant. Turning next to employers joining firm-level contracts from nocoverage, the estimates clearly indicate that workers in joining plants incur positive and significant wage premiums that last for at least two further years. Even though the differences in observables in Panel A in Table A3 show that joining plants appear to be larger and more capital intensive than those always staying uncovered, the insignificant differences in pre-transition wage growth across regime switchers and stable plants do not provide evidence of a potential endogeneity bias. The descriptives further suggest that joining plants have significantly more often a works council than those always staying uncovered. This indicates that, other than for industry-level contracts, works councils might be an import means to enforce firmlevel contracts. Note that this finding is consistent with firm-level contracts being strongly determined by firm-specific union organisation, as a large majority of works councilors are generally recruited from union members. Overall, however, we wish to note that these estimates are to be interpreted with particular caution as they are based on a very small number of establishments joining firm-level contracts.
Taken together, the analysis of separate transitions suggests that the insignifi- 
Robustness Checks
In this section, we assess the sensitivity of our findings with respect to our imputation procedure. To do so, we reestimated the wage premiums associated with the separate regime switches using the raw transitions. In the original sample, we observe 617
transitions as compared to 253 transitions reported in Table 3 . 26 Overall, the pattern of results is similar to that in Table 5 , even though the transitions between industrylevel contracts and no-coverage are estimated with less precision. Note that this is consistent with the estimates being biased towards zero due to some employers misreporting contract status changes. A major exception that stands out are the transitions from no-coverage to firm-level contracts. Contrary to what has been found earlier, the wage premium is negative in t and becomes significantly positive only with some time lag in t + 1 and t + 2. Thus, the positive wage premiums found earlier appear to be particularly sensitive to the adopted imputation and exclusion of plants with many contract status changes. Note that the established negative wage premium after including plants reporting several back and forth regime switches suggests that the latter are likely to be particularly negatively selected.
Summary and Conclusions
Using a large linked employer-employee data set from western German manufacturing, this paper has provided new evidence on collective bargaining wage premiums.
By using longitudinal data, we seek to improve on recent evidence which relies on cross-sectional data to estimate the collective bargaining premium. Summing up, our results indicate that between 70 and 80 per cent of the wage premium associated with industry and firm-level contracts can be explained by differences in observables.
Overall, the results suggest that differences in firm characteristics account for the largest proportion of omitted variable bias.
Taken together, the pooled differenced specifications suggest the following conclusions. First, differences in observables and unobservables nearly explain the full firm and industry-level contract wage premium. In failing to detect substantial wage premiums relative to uncovered firms, our findings seem to be in line with the results reported by Hartog et al. (2002) , who find no evidence of substantial industry and firm-level contract wage premiums for the Netherlands. The authors interpret this result as a consequence of the relatively corporatist Dutch wage determination system. Note that a similar conclusion might apply to Germany, where centralised unions are likely to internalise negative externalities resulting from their wage demands. A further possible explanation might be that our identification strategy cannot rule out the possibility that the small estimated wage premiums may be an artefact of formal contract changes that are not paralleled by changes in actual wage policies. For example, the small estimated wage mark-ups might be driven by the fact that those establishments joining industry-level contracts already informally followed the terms of such contracts (or, alternatively, that those who formally leave industry-level bargaining continue to apply the contract terms). Particularly for the transitions that involve leaving industry-level contracts we are able to rule out such an explanation. The results suggest that workers in firms leaving industrylevel bargaining may incur wage losses relative to those workers who are employed by "stable" firms. However, adjusting the estimates for differential time trends supports the notion that plants changing from industry-level contracts to no coverage experience more negative time-specific shocks than stable plants, thereby confirming the result that there is no "true" wage effect of leaving wage bargaining.
For firm-level contracts, the analysis of separate transitions suggests that the overall insignificant wage premiums that have been obtained from the pooled differenced regressions mask substantial heterogeneity across the different transitions.
The separate transitions indicate that joining firm-level bargaining from no-coverage may well be associated with a positive wage premium, whereas the transitions between firm and industry-level contracts tend to give rise to negative wage premiums of firm-level contracts. This finding is consistent with firm-level bargaining being initiated by employers who were formerly covered by an industry-level contract and argues against the view that unions tend to enforce such contracts in order to secure above average wage gains in highly successful firms. Source: LIAB 1999-2007. The estimates of the wage premiums are obtained by estimating the interacted spell differenced specification using the respective subsamples of establishments (those that experience the change in contract status and those that retain the origin regime). Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the establishment-level. J refers to the number of establishments and N refers to the number of individuals experiencing the transitions. 
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